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Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Case for
Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability
Ned J. Nakles*
I. Introduction
A time-honored maxim teaches us that the quality of a civilization can
be determined by the treatment it accords to those accused of crime. If that
is correct, civilization under the United States Constitution ranks among
the highest in history.
Beginning with Gideon v. Wainwright' in 1963, a line of constitu-
tional cases has assured counsel to virtually all indigent criminal defend-
ants. With the advent of public defender systems and court-appointed
counsel in both state and federal courts, 2 the quality of criminal defense has
been increased to the point where some contend that an indigent gets better
representation than one who can afford a lawyer.
Nonetheless, more and more criminal defendants are suing their own
lawyers for money damages to compensate for alleged mistakes made in
the course of a criminal defense. The actions are brought under the Civil
Rights Act3 or in state courts by alleging malpractice.
*B.A. 1952, Washington and Jefferson College; J.D. 1956, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law; 1956-58 Clerk to Chief Judge Austin Staley, United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit; Member, Westmoreland County and Pennsylvania Bars.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. The public defender system in Pennsylvania was created by the Public Defender
Act of 1968, P.L. 1144, No. 358, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 9960.1-.13 (Supp.
1976). On the federal level, each United States District Court has enacted plans for the
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
A defendant suing his lawyer pursuant to the Civil Rights Act confronts the problem of
establishing action under color of law. Various courts have held that a public defender or
court-appointed counsel does not act under color of law with respect to his actions on behalf
of the criminal defendant. See, e.g., Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1973); Barnes v.
Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1973); cf. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975)
(investigator acting for public defender).
The success of a suit against a privately employed defense attorney under the Civil Rights
Nothing can be more discouraging to a criminal defense lawyer than
to be sued by his own client after he has exerted every possible effort to
protect that client. The criminal defense lawyer-whether privately em-
ployed, court-appointed or a public defender-must be given absolute
immunity from civil liability for damages. Such immunity is necessary for
the efficient administration of our criminal justice system. Moreover, a
contrary rule would invite dissatisfied clients to initiate a multiplicity of
suits based upon fancied wrongs. The very prospect of a lawsuit has the
effect of inhibiting the lawyer in the exercise of judgment in the manage-
ment of the defense.4 The resultant harm falls on society and the defendant
himself.
The rule of absolute civil immunity for the criminal defense lawyer is
based upon historical precedent and strong public policy, and that immu-
nity rule is the subject of this article.
II. Immunity for Persons Involved in the Judicial Process
Judicial immunity is a principle of long standing. 5 It has been said that
subjecting judges to civil liability for their judicial actions would "con-
tribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation. "6
The Supreme Court reaffirmed judicial immunity as one of its doctrines:
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law
than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recog-
nized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
335 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is
accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it 'is not for the
protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the
benefit of the public, whose interest it is that judges should be at
liberty to exercise their functions with independence and with-
out fear of consequences.'
7
Judges enjoy the same immunity under Pennsylvania law.
8
Other persons directly involved in the judicial process may receive
Act is more doubtful as he is neither appointed by the court nor paid by the state. See, e.g.,
Steward v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1972); Dyer v. Rosenberg, 434 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1970).
Compare United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F. Supp. 713, 716-17 (E.D. Wis.
1975) (immunity of attorney in civil action); Timson v. Weiner, 395 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Ohio
1975) (abuse of subpoena power).
4. In an 1888 Maryland case, Judge McSherry recognized the need to provide lawyers
with immunity from defamation suits arising out of the course of litigation: "The liability to be
sued is the thing which will fetter and trammel the counsel in the discharge of his duty quite as
much as any apprehension of the consequences of such a suit." Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69
Md. 143, 14 A. 505, 515 (1888).
5. The doctrine of judicial immunity is a product of the common law. Generally, it
extends to acts performed with proper jurisdiction. SeeAckerley v. Parkinson, 105 Eng. Rep.
665 (1815); Gorenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202 (1696); 1 STEPHEN'S COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 94 (19th ed. 1928); 3 id. at 530.
6. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
7. Id. at 553-54.
8. In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936) (magistrate); Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 Dall.
160 (Pa. 1792); Commonwealth v. Cauffiel, 79 Pa. Super. Ct. 596 (1922) (mayor); Nelson v.
Wagner, 60 Dela. Cty. 608 (Pa. C.P. 1973) (district justice of the peace); Hardy v. Kirchner, 59
Lanc. 85 (Pa. C.P. 1964) (immune even if act deliberate and malicious); Cooney v. Greevy, 27
Pa. D. & C.2d 739 (C.P. Lycom. 1962) (even if malice or corruption alleged).
quasi-judicial immunity in their own right or they may enjoy immunity
because they perform ministerial duties at the direction of the judge. 9 The
correct test for the extension of immunity to various participants in the
judicial system was stated in Robichaud v. Ronan:10
The key to the immunity. . . is that the acts, alleged to have
been wrongful, were committed by the officer in the perform-
ance of an integral part of the judicial process."
Judicial immunity has been extended to cover virtually all persons
acting in judicial proceedings: federal prosecutors, 12 state prosecutors
under federal13 and Pennsylvania law, 4 clerks of court,1
5 parol boards, 16
probation officers,17 court reporters,18 public defenders,19 court-appointed
defense lawyers in federal criminal cases, 20 and state-appointed criminal
defense lawyers.
21
Together in the same courtroom, the judge, the prosecutor and the
defense counsel perform separate but common functions in a joint effort to
achieve substantial justice. 22 All should be entitled to the same protection
from civil liability.
III. Immunity of Public Defenders and Court-Appointed Counsel
Several cases have considered and approved the extension to public
defenders of immunity from liability under the Civil Rights Act.23 In
9. Cf. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975).
10. 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) (held cause of action stated against county attorney
where plaintiff alleged wrongful acts were ordinarily police functions).
11. Id. at 536.
12. E.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503
(1927).
13. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (action under Civil Rights Act). Accord,
Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1975); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir,
1973); Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967); Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1966);
Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir, 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 868 (1962).
14. Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 475 F.2d 887, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1973); Hardy v.
Kirchner, 59 Lanc. 85, 87 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
15. E.g., Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1970).
16. E.g., Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990
(1969); Robinson v. Largent, 311 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
17. E.g., Friedman v. Younger, 282 F. Supp. 710, 715-16 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
18. E.g., Brown v. Charles, 309 F. Supp. 817, 817-18 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
19. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203,205 (3d Cir. 1975); John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786,788
(7th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972); Morrow v. Igleburger, 67
F.R.D. 675,681 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Reese v. Danforth, -Pa. Super. Ct. -, 360A.2d 629(1976)
(affirming lower court holding of immunity of public defender). Contra, Spring v. Constan-
tino, 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975) (malpractice action against public defender).
20. Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th
Cir. 1966).
21. E.g., Minns v. Paul, 45 U.S.L.W. 2118(4th Cir. Aug. 9,1976); Joyce v. Gilligan, 383
F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
22. Counsel for the accused is an essential component of the administration of
criminal justice. A court properly constituted to hear a criminal case must be
viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge (and jury, where appropriate),
counsel for the prosecution, and counsel for the accused.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 1.l(a) (Approved Draft 1971)
[hereinafter cited as DEFENSE FUNCTION].
23. Actions by criminal defendants against their own lawyers are frequently brought
under the Civil Rights Act, which provides remedies for deprivation of constitutional rights by
persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1970). The sweeping language of
the Civil Rights Act making "every person:' subject to such liability has been held not to
abrogate common-law immunity accorded to the actions of certain persons, especially those
Brown v. Joseph24 a Pennsylvania criminal defendant sued the defense
counsel who was employed by the public defender's office to represent
him. In a well-reasoned opinion by Judge Aldisert, the Third Circuit
concluded that "a county Public Defender, whose office is created under
the Pennsylvania statute, enjoys immunity from liability," even under the
assumption that he acts under color of state law.25 In a similar case the
Seventh Circuit illustrated the breadth of this rule of immunity:
Assuming, however, that defendant could be deemed to be
acting under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act], and allowing for the possibility that plaintiff's proof
might demonstrate such incompetency as to amount to a depriva-
tion of sixth amendment rights, we think that, as a matter of law,
defendant is immune from liability for damages, and plaintiff's
complaint must fail.
26
The rule of immunity has not been confined to actions under the Civil
Rights Act. In Walker v. Kruse27 a criminal defendant sued his court-
appointed attorney alleging malpractice. Unsuccessful in state court, 28 he
filed a diversity action in the federal district court, which dismissed the
action. The circuit court affirmed:
[T]here are strong reasons of policy which might persuade the
Illinois courts to hold that a lawyer, who has been appointed to
serve without compensation in the defense of an indigent citizen
accused of crime, should be immune from malpractice liability.
Requiring such lawyers to defend charges such as this can only
make it more difficult for the Bar to discharge its professional
responsibilities . . . .The reasoning which provides immunity
for various public officials. . . is also applicable to the perform-
ance by private citizens of public services which play a signifi-
cant role in the administration of justice.29
It is a salutory public policy that those accused of crime should have
proper representation regardless of their station in life and regardless of
their wealth or poverty. This policy is seriously undermined if defense
counsel is subjected to potential tort liability for decisions made in the
conduct of the defense. The cases that speak in terms of the "chilling
involved in the judicial process. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)
(legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecuting attorney). Consequently, many civil rights cases provide
good authority for determining the immunity of specified officials from tort liability under
common law inasmuch as an official who is immune at common law is also immune under the
Civil Rights Act. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
24. 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972).
25. Id. at 1049; accord, Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v.
Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966). See also O'Brien v. Colbath, 465 F.2d 358,359(5th Cir.
1972).
Similar results have been reached in Pennsylvania courts. See Reese v. Danforth, - Pa.
Super. Ct. -, 360 A.2d 629(1976) (affirming, without opinion, a decision in Lancaster County
Common Pleas Court); Barto v. Felix, No. 76-1302 (Pa. C.P. Lanc., Sept. 15, 1976) (allegedly
defamatory statement in press conference simply repeated statements in a brief filed in the
action).
26. John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786,788 (7th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). See also Morrow
v. Ingleburger, 67 F.R.D. 675, 681 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
27. 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973).
28. See Walker v. Pate, 53 Ii. 2d 485, 292 N.E.2d 387 (1973).
29. 484 F.2d at 804-05 (citations omitted).
effect" of potential tort liability on the tactics of defense counsel fully
understand the practical results of withholding immunity. To withhold
immunity may tend to discourage skilled individuals from assuming
defender roles; may inhibit the free and necessary exercise of professional
discretion; and may create conflicts between the attorney's desire to protect
himself and his mandate to represent the client*30
The role of the defense lawyer, perhaps more than that of the judge or
the prosecutor, requires freedom of action. The defense lawyer must be
unfettered in his vigorous and fearless defense of the accused. Often the
courtroom climate is hostile to his efforts when he represents an unpopular
client. As he exerts every effort to provide effective representation, he
should not be called upon to measure his every word in relation to the
personal consequences of a damage suit by his client.
Innocence confides its vindication to his skill, and his fiercest
conflicts are often the causes of the weak, the helpless, and the
oppressed. . . .If he is to stop during each of the many occa-
sions when he may thus be engaged. . . to measure each word
. . .lest he incur the perils of a civil suit . . . his efficiency
would be greatly diminished, and his usefulness most seriously
impaired.?
These considerations historically gave rise to the general rule of
immunity from defamation liability that has long been applied to attorneys
acting on behalf of their clients in court. 32 In a recent Supreme Court case,
support for more general tort immunity was found in the established rule of
defamation immunity.33 The Court ruled that a state prosecutor was
absolutely immune from an action under the Civil Rights Act even though
he may have knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately withheld
exculpatory information.' It is observed that in the law of defamation there
is "an absolute privilege for any courtroom statement relevant to the
subject matter of the proceedings," 35 and that privilege exists even as to
30. See, e.g., John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d
1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972); Ehn v. Price, 372 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. 11. 1974).
A district court in Wisconsin recently held that an attorney might be liable for malicious
use of garnishment proceedings because such liability in no way chills his duty to represent his
client with zeal. But even there, the court recognized the public policy need for immunity for
lawyers: Despite the foregoing, it is clear that as a general proposition, attorneys are
held to be immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if their clients
are not. . . .The Court recognizes that this principle of immunity is grounded
upon critical social considerations, for, if an attorney must work in constant fear of
civil liability, it is the rights of the public that will suffer. Any such threat of liability
visits an obvious chilling effect upon the attorney's enthusiasm to vigorously
defend his client's position. . . .The remedies guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act
are not to be invoked so as to create a conflict between the attorney's duty to
protect himself and to zealously represent his client. . . .As a matter of public
policy, the attorney must not be placed in a position where he is to gamble on the
outcome of a case, with his own personal liability hanging in the balance.
United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (citations
omitted).
31. Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 14 A. 505, 513 (1888) (dissenting opinion).
32. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.22 (1956).
33. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
34. 424 U.S. at 430.
35. Id. at 426 n.23.
deliberate publication of defamatory matter, regardless of intent, "belief in
its truth or . . . knowledge of its falsity. "36
IV. The Criminal Defense Lawyer Must be Free to Manage the Defense
Actions against criminal defense lawyers almost invariably arise from
the claim that the lawyer refused to follow his client's instructions about
questions to ask, witnesses to subpoena, or myriad other details in the
management of the defense. The criminal defendant frequently has strong
ideas about how the criminal case should be tried.
37
The ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function38 explains the
proper relationship of the client with his defense lawyer. The client, with
the advice of his counsel, is to make the final decision on these matters
only: whether to plead guilty; whether to take the stand; and whether to
waive jury trial. In all other matters, the judgment of the defense lawyer is
to control .39 Not only is the defense lawyer to exercise his independent
judgment, but "the defendant is bound by his lawyer's judgment with
respect to the conduct of the defense.' ,,
The Defense Function considered the fallacious view that the defense
lawyer is to be simply a conduit for his client's wishes:
It would be difficult to imagine anything which would more
gravely demean the advocate or undermine the integrity of our
system of justice than the idea that a defense lawyer should be
simply a conduit for his client's desires.
41
No civil action for damages ought ever to lie against a criminal
defense lawyer for alleged acts relating to the exercise of his independent
judgment. To the contrary, his position requires that he must exercise
independent judgment for the sake of the client he represents.
The rule of absolute immunity from civil liability for the criminal
defense lawyer is firmly implanted in the emerging case law.
V. The Criminal Defendant is Not Without Remedy
In civil matters, a lawyer's mistake can cause his client to lose money,
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586, comments a & b (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
See also Binder v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 324, 275 A.2d 53, 56 (1971)
(dictum); Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85, 89, 67 A. 991, 993 (1907) (allegedly libellous matter in
pleadings); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.22 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 114 at 778 (4th ed. 1971). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F (rent. Draft
No. 22, 1976) (applying § 586 immunity to invasion of privacy).
37. See quote, text at note 41 infra.
38. DEFENSE FuNCrIoN, supra note 22, § 3. 1.
39. Id. § 5.2. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 27-30, 334 A.2d 610, 615-17
(1975).
40. United States v. Meek, 388 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1968).
41. DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 22, at 146. The commentary to the standards for the
defense function states:
The "alter ego" concept of a defense lawyer, which sees him as a "mouthpiece"
for his client, is fundamentally wrong, unethical and destructive of the lawyer's
image; more important to the accused, perhaps, this pernicious idea is destructive
of the lawyer's usefulness. The lawyer's value to each client stems in large part
from the independence of his stance, as a professional representative rather than as
an ordinary agent.
Id. § 1.1, comment c, at 174.
and that loss can effectively be translated into a malpractice judgment
against the lawyer. This may be the client's only remedy. A lawyer's
mistake in a civil trial can hardly become the basis for a new trial-in fact,
it is usually an obstacle to the grant of a new trial.
In criminal cases, on the other hand, the criminal defendant is not left
without an adequate legal remedy. If the errors of defense counsel amount
to ineffective assistance of counsel, the criminal defendant will be awarded
a new trial. Further, "[v]indication of allegedly invaded federal rights may
be asserted by direct appeal, by state post conviction remedies, and by
federal habeas corpus petitions.' '42
Immunity from civil tort liability for the criminal defense lawyer does
not mean that he operates outside the law and free of its rules. He is still
subject to disciplinary procedures by bar associations, and to criminal
process for actions amounting to crimes as defined by criminal statutes. 43
In all judicial proceedings, judges, lawyers and witnesses are granted
absolute, indefeasible immunity from defamation liability. The offended
plaintiff is left without any remedy. The immunity principle is considered
important enough to uphold even to the point of allowing injury without
remedy. On the other hand, even if the criminal defense lawyer is accorded
immunity, the criminal defendant's rights can be protected in a variety of
ways, including a new trial.
VI. Conclusion
The criminal defense lawyer plays as important a role in our system of
justice as the prosecutor and the judge. All are entitled to absolute
immunity from civil liability. Common sense compels it. Case law requires
it. Public policy justifies it.
Representation amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel can be
adequately remedied by the grant of a new trial.
The public in general, and the criminal defendant in particular, will
suffer from any rule that would cause the defense lawyer to gauge his
conduct by the possibility that the client could sue him for damages if he
were not satisfied with the outcome. The inhibiting effect it would have on
the management of a criminal defense would far outweigh any social utility
of allowing a civil action for damages against the criminal defense lawyer.
Under the present case law, no action for damages against a court-
appointed defense lawyer should survive preliminary objections raising the
issue of immunity. The same rule should apply to all criminal defense
lawyers, appointed or retained.
42. Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972).
43. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).

